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R
esidential foreclosures in the United States have been rising very
rapidly since 2006. In the second quarter of 2007, the share of  
outstanding mortgages in some stage of foreclosure stood at 1.4
percent, near historic highs and up from less than 1 percent a year
earlier. The number of mortgages entering the foreclosure process
reached an all-time high in mid-2007, suggesting that the foreclosure
surge is likely to get worse before it gets better.
The foreclosure surge was created by a perfect storm of events. First,
in recent years the share of subprime mortgage originations increased
substantially. Subprime mortgages—that is, home loans made to bor-
rowers with impaired credit (see glossary)—have substantially higher
rates of foreclosures than prime mortgages. Second, foreclosure rates for
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) have increased considerably, espe-
cially for subprime ARMs. This increase is largely due to rising
short-term interest rates and to payment resets for many nontraditional
mortgages. Finally, high loan-to-value originations in recent years,
coupled with stagnant or falling home prices, have left many people
with insufficient equity to sell or refinance their homes. 
Kelly Edmiston is a senior economist in Community Affairs at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City. Roger Zalneraitis is a research associate at the bank. This article
is on the bank’s website at www.KansasCityFed.org.
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This article provides a detailed dissection of the current foreclosure
surge. The first section highlights the current trends in foreclosure rates,
both over time and across space. The second section describes the fore-
closure process and the circumstances that typically lead lenders to
foreclose. The third section details the three factors underlying the
current spike and explains how these factors have interacted to create a
perfect storm. The article concludes by discussing why the foreclosure
situation is likely to get worse over the next two to three years and why
it is likely to improve after that time period.
I. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE
As economic conditions change, the foreclosure rate typically
changes as well. Since 1979, however, foreclosure rates have rarely
declined for an extended period of time (Chart 1). Foreclosure rates rose
steadily until the mid-1980s. While there are many explanations for this
upward trend in the 1980s, the likely causes were high interest rates,
weak real estate markets, and an energy glut in some parts of the
country. Foreclosure rates then leveled off until about 1995, when they
began to rise again. Foreclosures spiked to a record high in 2002, largely
as a result of the recession in 2001. After this spike, rates declined sub-
stantially and were settling to levels similar to those in the mid-1990s
when the current surge began in early 2006. 
The number of new foreclosures has been rising each quarter since
1979 as well. Perhaps most notable is how rapidly new foreclosures have
increased since 2006. In the second quarter of 2007, 0.65 percent of all
mortgages entered foreclosure. To put this Chart into perspective, before
2006 the new foreclosure rate reached 0.5 percent of all mortgages only
once. Since the third quarter of 2006, the new foreclosure rate has per-
sistently been near or above that rate—an unprecedented event over the
last 38 years.
Although current U.S. foreclosure rates are high, at 1.4 percent, not
all areas of the nation are affected equally. The highest foreclosure rates
are found in the upper Midwest, where Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana
have foreclosure rates more than 50 percent above the national average
(Map 1). These three states face the same basic foreclosure problems as
other states but also suffer some economic difficulties. In particular,
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Chart 1
FORECLOSURE INVENTORY AND INITIATION RATES
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1979 TO PRESENT
Map 1
U.S. FORECLOSURE RATES
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)





















Foreclosures Started During Quarter






























    118 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
declines in the relatively high-paying manufacturing sector have kept
unemployment rates relatively high and income growth low. In most of
the United States, by contrast, the economy is quite strong and unem-
ployment rates are historically low. Foreclosure rates also tend to exceed
the national average in the Gulf states of Louisiana and Mississippi, due
in large part to the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes. 
Some states are faring much better than the nation as a whole. States
in the Pacific Northwest have foreclosure rates of less than half the
national average. Foreclosure rates are also generally below average in the
desert Southwest and the Northeast, although Nevada, Pennsylvania,
and Maine are exceptions.
The states with the greatest increases in foreclosures since early 2006
are not those with the highest overall foreclosure rates. Not one of the
ten states with the greatest increase in foreclosures is among the ten
states with the highest foreclosure rates in mid-2007. California, for
instance, has seen an almost fourfold increase in foreclosures since 2006,
but has only the 29th highest rate of foreclosures in the nation. The fact
that states with high foreclosure rates are not among those with the
fastest growing rates of foreclosure suggests that many high-foreclosure
states have longer–term problems that are unrelated to the causes of the
current surge.
II. CAUSES OF MORTGAGE DEFAULT 
AND FORECLOSURE
Foreclosure is a two-step process. In the first step the borrower
misses a scheduled payment and becomes delinquent. Lenders typically
assume the initial delinquency is temporary and that the borrower
intends to resume payments in the future. Once several payments are
missed (typically three), the borrower is considered to have defaulted
with no plans to resume payment. At this point, the lender may choose
to take the second step by foreclosing. 
One possibility for explaining default (and subsequent foreclosure)
is a pure wealth-maximizing motive. The mortgagor in essence can at
any time sell his property to the lender for the outstanding balance of
the mortgage.
1 He exercises this option to sell by defaulting on pay-
ments and, through foreclosure, receives value by purging his payment
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obligation on the mortgage. This transaction increases wealth if the
home is worth less than the outstanding balance on the mortgage. Such
defaults are often termed “ruthless defaults.” They are ruthless in the
sense that the mortgagor has the ability to pay but chooses not to. Ruth-
less defaulters tend to “reveal themselves” by having high loan-to-value
ratios and suffering local price declines prior to default (Ambrose and
Capone, p. 398).
Empirical evidence finds a strong relationship between negative
equity and default. In fact, as much as 90 percent of the variation in
foreclosures over time can be explained by negative equity (Foster and
Van Order). Default is “essentially instantaneous” when negative equity
exceeds 10 percent (Quigley and Van Order, p. 112). 
Although most defaults tend to be consistent with the wealth-maxi-
mizing motive, studies generally find that the option to sell is typically
under exercised. In other words, there are not as many defaults as there
should be if borrowers are ruthless wealth maximizers. 
One explanation for this behavior is that, in making the decision to
default at any point in time, the borrower must consider the value of
being able to default at some later date. Thus, for a default to be
optimal, the benefits of defaulting today must outweigh the benefits of
defaulting on any later date. 
There are additional costs beyond the loss of the option to “sell” at a
future date. There are direct costs, such as legal fees, as well as significant
indirect costs, such as a reduction in both creditworthiness and personal
reputation that comes with foreclosure. Considering these other costs,
the equity threshold for defaulting would be expected to be substantially
below zero. 
Another empirically recognized departure from the pure wealth-
maximizing motive is that some borrowers default when they have
positive equity. Default is profitable when the balance of the mortgage
exceeds the value of the home less selling (transactions) costs. These
selling costs can be significant. For example, real estate commissions
average 5.1 percent, and many sellers pay 6 or 7 percent (Real Trends).
The mortgagor does not have to be in a negative equity position to prof-
itably default. All that is required is that (positive) equity not exceed the
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cost of selling. This scenario is especially likely for liquidity-constrained
households, who have little cash or other liquid assets with which to
make up the difference upon sale. 
Liquidity-constrained households who default with positive equity
generally are having trouble making their payments. This difficulty
usually arises from some kind of “trigger event,” such as a job loss or an
unexpected expense, as might occur with a serious illness or accident.
Another possibility that explains many recent defaults is a jump in the
mortgage payment that arises because of higher interest rates on an ARM
or a payment reset on a loan with a low initial rate (“teaser rate”). Trigger-
event defaulters proceed to foreclosure only if they cannot reinstate the
mortgage by mitigating the loss in income or the unforeseen expenditure.
In reality, it is the intersection between trigger events and an adverse
equity position that is likely to precipitate a default (Riddiough). 
Once a borrower defaults, the lender eventually takes action to fore-
close. The length of time borrowers are able to forestall foreclosure varies
with the lender’s willingness to work with the borrower or renegotiate
the loan terms. This willingness depends largely on the costs of foreclo-
sure, which in turn depend on state laws.
Laws governing mortgage foreclosures can differ substantially across
states. The primary difference across states is whether or not judicial
foreclosure is required. A judicial foreclosure occurs when a mortgage
deed does not have a power of sale clause, thus compelling the lender to
take the borrower to court.
2 A court orders the foreclosure and super-
vises any subsequent sale and the disbursement of the proceeds. A
nonjudicial foreclosure occurs outside of the court system. Twenty-one
states required judicial foreclosure in 2006.
3
Nonjudicial foreclosures typically are less costly to the lender than
judicial foreclosures. The judicial foreclosure takes five months longer,
on average, and imposes additional transactions costs (Pence). A 1985
study of foreclosure costs under judicial and nonjudicial systems found
that the combination of additional monetary costs, such as legal fees,
and the costs associated with delaying sale in judicial foreclosures
increased costs by 260 percent, on average, relative to nonjudicial fore-
closures (Bauer; Kahn and Yavas). These increased costs have been
verified by a number of other empirical studies, with some findings
showing the difference to be as much as 10 percent of the loan balance
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(Pence). The increased costs associated with judicial foreclosures have
been reflected in lower foreclosure rates in states that require judicial
foreclosures (Clauretie). These costs also tend to be reflected in higher
contract interest rates for mortgages that lack a power of sale clause
(Meador; Kahn and Yavas).
Foreclosure costs and rates can also be affected by whether a state
has statutory or equitable redemption, and whether the state allows defi-
ciency judgments. Statutory redemption refers to the period of time after
a foreclosure sale during which the borrower has the right to redeem the
property by paying the principal balance, accrued interest, any penalties
or fees, and court costs. The redemption period varies widely across the
United States. Statutory redemption extends the foreclosure and liqui-
dation process and adds to loan losses and therefore should work to
reduce the rate of foreclosures (Clauretie and Herzog).
Statutory redemption differs from equitable redemption, which is the
period of time between default and foreclosure during which the mort-
gagor can redeem the property by paying the sum due. Longer periods of
equitable redemption work to reduce the number of foreclosures by giving
the borrower more time to accrue sufficient cash flow to avoid foreclosure.
Deficiency judgments allow the lender to attempt to recover funds
that remain unpaid after the foreclosure sale. The ease with which the
lender can sue for these funds varies across states. The availability of
deficiency judgments has the opposite effect on foreclosure rates as fore-
closure relief, such as redemption (Kahn and Yavas). 
While state laws affect foreclosures at the margin, they cannot
reduce the total foreclosure rate when adverse conditions affect an
increasing number of homeowners. As the number of defaults increase,
the number of cases where foreclosure is the least costly option will
increase as well.
III. THE PERFECT STORM
Some homeowners (often investors) simply walk away from their
homes and mortgage obligations when faced with highly negative net
equity, but generally a foreclosure is the result of an inability to make
mortgage payments, coupled with insufficient equity to cure the default
          122 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
by selling the home. There are always some people in these positions,
and thus the foreclosure rate has a natural ebb and flow, depending
largely on economic conditions and the state of the housing market. 
Rapid increases in the foreclosure rate, however, are relatively rare.
Usually, they result from poor economic conditions, such as recessions,
which tend to drive up unemployment and reduce personal income,
leaving many with the inability to make their mortgage payments.
Rising real estate values can mitigate the rise, so periods of especially
high foreclosures are usually also associated with stagnant, if not declin-
ing, home prices.
The dramatic spike in foreclosures since 2006 is unusual in that the
economy has been quite strong in most parts of the United States.
Income growth has been solid, and unemployment rates are low by his-
torical standards. The current foreclosure surge is a result of three
conditions that have come together to create a “perfect storm” in the
mortgage market. 
First, subprime lending increased significantly between 2004 and
2006. Since subprime loans have higher foreclosure rates than prime
loans, this increase in itself would be expected to lead to an increase in
foreclosures. Second, large numbers of new mortgages were nontradi-
tional. Nontraditional loans often reset to much higher payments within
a few short years. These resets have been compounded by increases in
short-term interest rates, which have affected not only nontraditional
mortgages but more traditional adjustable-rate products as well, espe-
cially in the subprime sector. Third, declining home prices have put
many homeowners in the position of being unable to sell or refinance
their homes when faced with an inability to pay higher mortgage pay-
ments. These three factors have combined to lead to a sharp increase in
foreclosure rates.
Subprime lending
Subprime mortgages are home loans made to borrowers with
impaired credit. Because they are more risky, they carry interest rates
that are higher, sometimes much higher, than equivalent prime loans.
Unsurprisingly, given their higher risk, subprime mortgages are much
more likely to default than are prime mortgages (Immergluck and
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Smith). In the second quarter of 2007, the latest date for which data
were available at this writing, a seasonally adjusted 14.5 percent of out-
standing subprime mortgages were at least 30 days past due, and 5.5
percent were in foreclosure (Mortgage Bankers Association). At the same
time, only 2.6 percent of prime mortgages were 30 or more days past
due, and just 0.6 percent were in foreclosure. 
Another form of nonprime mortgage is the Alt-A mortgage, which
is usually a loan made to a borrower who has a relatively high credit
score but lacks sufficient (or any) documentation of income.
4 In many
cases, income cannot be documented, such as for the self-employed. But
many Alt-A mortgages are made to people who overstate their income.
By doing so, applicants can qualify for a mortgage for which they would
not qualify if they were required to fully document their income. The
interest rates on Alt-A mortgages are generally 25 to 50 basis points
higher than those on equivalent fully documented mortgages. Default
rates on Alt-A mortgages are higher than on prime mortgages, but less
than those on subprime mortgages. 
Subprime mortgage lending became possible with federal legislation
in 1980, which eliminated states’ interest rate ceilings on first lien home
mortgages. Lenders were then able to raise interest rates high enough to
compensate for the extra risk imposed by subprime borrowers. Sub-
prime lending was not common until the 1990s, when developments in
capital markets, specifically widespread securitization of subprime loans,
made subprime mortgage lending less risky for originators.
5 Securitiza-
tion allowed mortgage lenders to pool the risks and efficiently allocate
the pooled risks to investors most willing to bear them.
From May 2000 to June 2003, the average interest rate on a con-
ventional, conforming 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) fell from 8.5
percent to 5.2 percent (Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market
Survey).
6 With this decline in the cost of funds, mortgage originations
sky-rocketed, largely due to refinancing. From 2001 to 2003, total
mortgage originations grew 78 percent, from $2.2 trillion to $3.9 tril-
lion (Inside Mortgage Finance) (Chart 2). The 119 percent increase in
refinances was even more dramatic.
As mortgage originations grew, so did the mortgage industry. From
2001 to 2003, jobs in the real estate credit industry increased 43
percent, from roughly 231,000 to 331,000.
7 By 2004, many people had
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already refinanced their prime mortgages, some multiple times. As inter-
est rates started to regain ground in that year, the demand for further
refinancing diminished significantly, and the real estate credit market,
saturated with brokers, started to dry up. In an effort to maintain volume
and market share, many mortgage brokers moved aggressively into the
relatively untapped subprime market. With real estate markets booming,
they found many willing customers who formerly had little or no access
to mortgage financing. Given relatively low interest rates in the recent
term, there were also many investors starved for the high yields subprime
mortgages could bring. Thus, a major market quickly developed.
From 2003 to 2006, subprime mortgage originations swelled from
$335 billion to $600 billion (Inside Mortgage Finance). Over the same
period, Alt-A originations increased almost fivefold, from $85 billion to
about $400 billion. In 2003, less than 11 percent of originations were
nonprime (subprime or Alt-A) (Chart 3). By 2006, more than one-third
of all mortgage originations were nonprime, including more than 20
percent that were subprime. 
Because the nonprime foreclosure rate is so much higher than the
prime foreclosure rate, the overall foreclosure rate naturally increased. If
the subprime share of mortgages outstanding were the same in the
second quarter of 2007 as it had been in 2003, the second quarter 2007
overall foreclosure rate would be an estimated 0.98 percent rather than
Chart 2
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the actual 1.40 percent, a reduction of 30 percent.
8 Insufficient data are
available to calculate the effect of Alt-A mortgages, but given their
higher-than-prime foreclosure rate and the increased share of origina-
tions since 2003, a full analysis would yield an estimated fixed-share
foreclosure rate of much less than 0.98 percent.
Increasing subprime ARM foreclosure rate
While the subprime share of outstanding mortgages has been
increasing in recent years, the subprime foreclosure rate has also been
rising rapidly, especially for loans with adjustable rates. Most dramati-
cally, the foreclosure rate for subprime ARMs increased from 3.9
percent in the second quarter of 2006 to 8.0 percent in the second
quarter of 2007 (Chart 4). The foreclosure rate for prime ARMs has
increased as well, from 0.6 percent to 1.3 percent, but these loans
remain a relatively small share of total foreclosures. Increases in short-
term interest rates and payment resets on nontraditional mortgages are
largely responsible for the increase in the foreclosure rates of ARMs.
Homeowners enjoyed a dramatic appreciation in home prices
beginning in 2001 and lasting through 2005. Over that period, the
average home in the United States appreciated by about 53 percent
Chart 3
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(Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight), while personal
income increased by just more than 20 percent (Bureau of Economic
Analysis).
9 As a result, homeownership became relatively less affordable.
In response to higher home values, many would-be homeowners found
themselves priced out of the market. In an effort to price themselves
back in, borrowers increasingly sought ARMs and nontraditional mort-
gage products for their lower initial payments. 
The interest rate on an ARM at any point in time is closely linked
to short-term Treasury yields, while the interest rate on a FRM is linked
to long-term Treasury yields. In 2004, short-term interest rates were sig-
nificantly lower than long-term interest rates, and ARMs were therefore
relatively attractive. Roughly half of all mortgages originated in 2004
were ARMs, compared to only one-quarter of all originations in the pre-
vious year (Inside Mortgage Finance). Close to half of all mortgages
originated in 2005 and 2006 also were ARMs.
Because ARMs usually have lower interest rates than FRMs, they
often make sense for people who intend to stay in their homes for only
short periods of time, such as five to seven years. The borrower can get
an ARM with a relatively low fixed rate for this length of time, after
which the rate becomes variable. As long as the loan is repaid in that
Chart 4
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time frame, there is no risk of payment shock. If the ARM is maintained
after the initial fixed-rate period, however, monthly payments in an
environment of rising interest rates can increase substantially. 
From June 2003 to June 2006, the one-year constant maturity Trea-
sury yield increased from 1.0 percent to 5.2 percent. Alternative
short-term interest rate indexes mirrored this increase. For a traditional
3/1 prime ARM initiated in June 2004, where the initial rate is fixed for
three years and then resets annually, the average monthly payment on a
$200,000 mortgage would have increased 37 percent by mid-2007
(Table 1).
10 Faced with such a large increase in monthly mortgage pay-
ments, many ARM borrowers were unable to stay current.
The rise in short-term interest rates in the last few years is only part
of the cause of large payment shocks. Many nontraditional mortgage
products can have substantial payment resets even when interest rates
are stable. The low initial payments associated with these loans are
attractive in markets with unaffordable real estate. When they later reset,
however, the payment often becomes much larger than on a traditional
30-year FRM (Table 1). Various types of nontraditional mortgages are
available, and all of them are characterized by significant payment resets
after the initial two or three years of the loan. 
In the last few years, from two-thirds to three-quarters of subprime
mortgages originated were 2/28 or 3/27 hybrid ARMs.
11 These mort-
gages typically have a low teaser interest rate for the first two or three
years, followed by an adjustable interest rate in the ensuing 28 or 27
years. Because the teaser rate often is well below the market interest rate,
the payment reset can be substantial. For example, the payment on a
subprime 3/27 hybrid ARM with an initial teaser rate of 2.5 percent in
2004 would have jumped 120 percent in 2007.
12
Another ARM product common among subprime loans is the option
ARM. For the first few years of the mortgage, the borrower has the option
to pay a minimum monthly amount. Typically, this minimum payment is
substantially below the amount required to cover the interest accrued on
the loan, and thus the principal amount can grow significantly in a short
period. The payment resets to a fully amortizing rate. The minimum pay-
ments on a subprime 3/1 option ARM made on a loan of $200,000 in
2004 were as low as $643.
13 Even if short-term interest rates had remained
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steady, payments would have more than doubled after the initial period.
With the increase in short-term interest rates since 2004, however, the
payments may have actually tripled.
Other common nontraditional mortgage loans allow the borrower
to make interest-only payments for the first few years of the loan. Fol-
lowing this initial period, the principal loan amount is amortized over
the remaining years of the loan. Once again, the payment reset can be
fairly substantial. Payments on a three-year interest-only ARM made
when interest rates were at their low point in 2004 have nearly doubled
in 2007. While the increase is largely due to higher short-term interest
rates over the period, the payment at reset would be $44 higher than the
reset payment on a fully amortizing 3/1 ARM, reflecting the amortiza-
tion of the principal over 27 years rather than 30 years. 
Given the run-up in home prices in the early part of the decade, an
increasingly larger share of mortgages originated over the last few years
have been nontraditional mortgages. In 2004, roughly seven percent of
all mortgage originations were for interest-only or option ARMs, (Chart
5). By 2006, about 26 percent of mortgage originations were loans of
this type. These data actually underestimate the saturation of nontradi-
tional mortgages. Because of a lack of data, most 2/28 and 3/27 hybrid
ARMs are not included in this Chart.
14 
Table 1
HYPOTHETICAL INITIAL AND RESET MORTGAGE
PAYMENTS, BY LOAN TYPEa
Loan Type Initial Payment Payment Reset  Payment
Payment at Reset Shock w/o Change in 
Interest Ratesf
30-Yr FRMb $1,237 $1,237  -  - $1,237 
3/1 Prime ARMc $1,039  $1,420 $380  37% $1,039 
3/1 Prime Interest-Only ARMc $786  $1,462 $676  86% $1,093 
3/27 Subprime ARMd $790 $1,741  $951  120% $1,136 
3/1 Subprime Option ARMe $643 $1,907  $1,264  196% $1,309 
a$200,000 first mortgage initiated in June, 2004.
bFreddie Mac.
cInterest rate is LIBOR + 2.25 percent.
dInitial interest rate is 2.5 percent; On reset the interest rate is LIBOR + 4.50 percent.
eMinimum payment is equivalent to a 1.0 percent interest rate; Maximum LTV is 110 percent.
fAssumes LIBOR remained at its June, 2004 level throughout the period.
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Given the large penetration of nontraditional mortgages and other
adjustable-rate mortgages (many of which are subprime), along with the
payment shock associated with these mortgages, the escalation in ARM
foreclosure rates is not surprising. This payment shock is a strong default
trigger as many borrowers who would like to maintain their home find
themselves unable to make the much higher payments. 
Even with tight underwriting standards, many of these loans likely
would have been foreclosed upon after payment reset. In reality, underwrit-
ing standards, especially for state-regulated mortgage brokers, have been
very loose until recently, greatly exacerbating the foreclosure problem. 
Most subprime loans are originated by mortgage brokers, who assess
the creditworthiness of borrowers and submit approved loan applica-
tions to lenders, who fund the loans. The lenders, in turn, often sell the
loans through a trust to an underwriter (often Freddie Mac or Fannie
Mae, but also to many private underwriters). The underwriters package
the loans into securities to sell to investors. This securitization process
creates a large disconnect between the broker, who originates the mort-
gage, and the eventual owner of the mortgage. The incentive for the
mortgage broker is to originate as many loans as possible, with little
consideration given to the long-term viability of any one loan. Of
course, the broker must ensure that the loans meet underwriting stan-
Chart 5
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dards, but in recent years, due largely to a great appetite for the high
yields associated with risky loans, these standards became relatively
weak. In the last few years, the tendency of many mortgage brokers has
been to qualify borrowers at a loan’s initial payment amount. Many of
these borrowers would not have qualified for the loan at the fully amor-
tized payment amount. After reset, they are faced with payments they
cannot afford, and the only viable option for many is to terminate the
loan through refinance, sale, or default.
High loan-to-value, property market stagnation, and net equity
If borrowers could sell their properties or refinance their mortgages
when faced with problems making payments, the foreclosure problem
would not be nearly as severe. Unfortunately, many borrowers have
insufficient equity in their homes to cover the outstanding mortgage
plus the costs of selling, such as brokers’ commissions. Further, many
nontraditional loans have prepayment penalties as high as 3 percent of
the outstanding balance of the loan. The adverse equity position of these
borrowers can be explained largely by high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios at
origination, rampant equity extraction via secondary liens or cash-out
refinancing, and a stabilization or decline in home prices in many areas
of the country.
Over time, down payment requirements for mortgages have become
smaller and smaller, spurred in part by an increased willingness on the
part of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to accept high LTV loans (greater
than 90 percent) for securitization. Many mortgage brokers and lenders
in the last several years have offered products with no money down (100
percent LTV). In some cases, borrowers can roll closing costs into the
loan and borrow as much as 107 percent of the home’s value. 
Two-tiered “piggyback mortgages,” which combine first and second
mortgages at origination, are also becoming popular. An example is the
80-20 mortgage, which combines an 80 percent LTV first mortgage
with a 20 percent LTV second mortgage, resulting in a total LTV of 100
percent. A popular variation is the 80-10-10 mortgage, which includes
an 80 percent LTV first mortgage, a 10 percent LTV second mortgage,
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and 10 percent cash down. The second lien (subordinate loan) generally
is a revolving home equity line of credit but may also be in the form of
a closed-end (nonrevolving) second mortgage.
The share of first (primary) lien home purchase mortgages origi-
nated with LTVs above 90 percent actually has declined since 2000,
from about 22 percent to about 19 percent (Federal Housing Finance
Board). In some states, however, the ratio remains quite high. The
average LTV on these high LTV first mortgages is about 96 percent. 
These data probably significantly underestimate the number of
homeowners with high LTV mortgages because they exclude refinances
and second liens.
15 The somewhat surprising decline in high LTV loans
in this decade likely reflects increased use of two-tiered loans over high
LTV first mortgages that require primary mortgage insurance.
16 A 2004
study suggests that in the first half of that year, 42 percent of mortgage
loan dollars to purchase homes involved second liens, compared to less
than 20 percent in 2001 (SMR Research Corporation). These two-
tiered loans are especially common in places with high property values. 
In addition to high LTV originations, secondary liens and cash-out
refinancing can quickly lead to adverse equity positions in an environ-
ment of stable or declining home prices. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
eliminated interest deductions on consumer loans. Since then, home
equity has increasingly been used to finance consumer spending in order
to take advantage of the deductibility of mortgage interest. Often, home
equity is extracted with a secondary lien, but another option is to refi-
nance the first mortgage for an amount greater than the outstanding
balance of the loan (cash-out refinance). 
In 2006, 14.4 percent of the dollar volume of mortgage originations
was for secondary equity loans, compared to less than 5 percent in 2001
(Inside Mortgage Finance). These second liens are granted for a com-
bined LTV of up to 125 percent in some cases. 
Roughly 45 percent of all 2006 mortgage dollars were for refi-
nances. Of the refinanced mortgages purchased by Freddie Mac in that
year, 86 percent exceeded the payoff balance by at least 5 percent, indi-
cating that the borrower extracted equity from the home. In the first
half of 2007, the share of Freddie Mac-purchased refinances extracting
equity was 83 percent.
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With LTVs for many homeowners well over 90 percent, and in some cases
as high as 125 percent, many borrowers struggling to make mortgage payments
find themselves in the position of having inadequate equity in their homes to
pay off their mortgage and selling costs. This situation is exacerbated when home
prices are stagnant, or worse, falling. 
As noted above, from 2001 to 2005 the average appreciation in home prices
in the United States was 53 percent, according to the Office of Housing Enter-
prise Oversight’s (OFHEO) Home Price Index. Since that period, home prices
have stabilized across the country and, in many places, declined. 
Home price appreciation rates can vary significantly depending on
the index used to measure prices (Rappaport). Still, all major indexes
show price appreciation declining over the last two years, if not turning
negative. According to the National Association of Realtors (NAR),
home prices in the United States declined 1.5 percent over the year
ending second quarter 2007, after rising more than 12 percent in the
2004-05 period. Another index, S&P/Case-Shiller, shows U.S. prices
declining 3.2 percent in the year ending second quarter 2007. While the
OFHEO House Price Index shows continued growth of 3.2 percent, the
growth rate in the index is down from more than 13 percent for the year
ending second quarter 2005. 
The perfect storm
The sudden and rapid rise in foreclosures has resulted from a con-
fluence of these three conditions. Any one condition—stagnating home
prices and rising LTVs, payment resets on nontraditional mortgages
resulting in payment shocks, or an increase in the market share of sub-
prime mortgages—would cause an increase in the foreclosure rate. The
confluence of these three factors, however, has caught an unusually large
number of homeowners in financially untenable situations with few
options except to default on their mortgage. 
This problem appears particularly acute in two areas. First, as seen
earlier, markets where housing was very unaffordable have been severely
affected. In these areas, many homebuyers resorted to ARM mortgages
and nontraditional mortgages in order to purchase a home. These
homebuyers may have believed that they were getting a “sure thing,”
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that is, a market where home prices would continue rising indefinitely,
or at least long enough for them to sell their property or refinance if
need be. 
In California, for instance, the OFHEO reports that home prices
were increasing over 20 percent per year from 2004 to early 2006. Since
2006, home price increases have virtually ceased in the state of Califor-
nia: OFHEO reports a home price decrease of 1.4 percent in California
in the second quarter of 2007. The expected equity accrual has evapo-
rated, leaving many homebuyers with ARMs unable to afford their
payment reset or sell their homes. As a result, foreclosures have gone up
almost fourfold since the beginning of 2006.
The second area experiencing large foreclosure rates are low-and
moderate-income communities. These communities are often home to
many high-risk borrowers, such as individuals with low credit scores or
unsteady employment. Data from several metropolitan areas in the
Midwest suggest that neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates tend to
be among the lowest income and lowest credit-score neighborhoods in
the city (see Table A.2). 
Like people in high-price regions, these homebuyers are at the
margin of being able to afford a house. These homebuyers often also get
nontraditional mortgages with significant prepayment penalties or
balloon payments. These penalties and balloon payments likely exceed
their equity and other savings, making it difficult; if not impossible; to
cover the costs associated with the sale of their home. As a result, many
of these homeowners may have little choice but to default when the
payment becomes unsustainable. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Foreclosure is a two-step process: First a default occurs, and then a
lender chooses to take a foreclosure action. Defaults generally arise from
some combination of low or negative equity and a trigger event. While
state laws may make foreclosure less costly to the lender in some places
than in others, eventually most mortgages in default end in foreclosure. 
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The U.S. foreclosure rate has increased dramatically in recent years.
Some recent foreclosures likely have been “ruthless defaults,” as property
values have declined in many areas. Were that a significant part of the
explanation, however, the country likely would have seen an increase in
foreclosure rates among all loan types. In reality, the increase in foreclo-
sure rates has been mostly confined to ARMs, especially subprime
ARMs. The available evidence suggests that in the face of rising short-
term interest rates and payment resets on nontraditional mortgages,
many borrowers have been unable to keep up with mortgage payments.
Those with low or negative equity have been unable to sell their proper-
ties to forestall foreclosure. Exacerbating the situation in recent years has
been an increase in the share of outstanding mortgages that are sub-
prime, as subprime mortgages have substantially higher foreclosure rates
than prime mortgages.
Part of the market saturation with nontraditional mortgages and
increased penetration of subprime lending can be explained by relatively
weak underwriting standards. With tighter standards now the norm, the
source of much of the current problem has been increasingly contained.
However, 2005 and 2006 were record years for subprime lending and
the origination of nontraditional mortgages. These nontraditional loans,
many of which are subprime, will reset over the 2007-09 period, so the
worst of the foreclosure problem may yet to have arrived. Developments
in money and real estate markets and the condition of the overall
economy will likely shape the near-term picture. Beyond this period,
because of tighter underwriting standards and fewer nontraditional orig-
inations, the foreclosure situation is likely to be substantially mitigated. 
  ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 135
APPENDIX
FORECLOSURES IN THE TENTH FEDERAL 
RESERVE DISTRICT
The foreclosure picture in the Tenth Federal Reserve District is
mixed. Foreclosure rates tend to be slightly lower than the national
average, in part because of a lower share of adjustable-rate mortgages.
But foreclosures on ARMs that exist are higher than the national
average, and some low- and moderate-income urban communities
appear to be experiencing significant foreclosure distress.
Foreclosures at the state level
Consistent with national trends, foreclosures in the Tenth District
increased substantially over the last year, rising from about 1.1 percent
to 1.3 percent of all outstanding mortgages (Chart A.1). But the level
has changed from being slightly above to slightly below the national
figure, which was 1.0 percent in the second quarter of 2006 and 1.4
percent in the second quarter of 2007. Both Colorado (1.6 percent in
the second quarter of 2007) and Oklahoma (1.7 percent) have consis-
tently suffered higher foreclosure rates than the nation as a whole, but
the remainder of the Tenth District has fared relatively well. Wyoming
has one of the lowest foreclosure rates in the country, a likely result of
the energy-driven economic boom in the state. Foreclosure rates have
declined in New Mexico, largely because of strong real estate markets,
and remain virtually unchanged in Kansas. 
An important factor in the relatively modest foreclosure rates in
most states of the Tenth District is that a smaller share of mortgages are
ARMs or subprime than in the nation as a whole. Almost 85 percent of
all prime loans in the Tenth District are FRMs, compared to 80 percent
nationally. Subprime loans comprise just over 12 percent of all outstand-
ing mortgages in the district, compared to 14 percent nationally.
One reason why there are fewer ARMs in the Tenth District than
nationally is that housing prices in the district are generally affordable.
Based on a comparison of median household income to median home
prices, all Tenth District states other than Colorado have more affordable
    136 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
housing than the nation as a whole. Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska
are among the ten most affordable states in the country, and in each of
these three states, fixed-rate mortgages account for 90 percent or more of
all prime loans. In Colorado, by contrast, the share of ARMs is high. In
the second quarter of 2007, almost one-quarter of prime mortgages and
two-thirds of subprime mortgages in Colorado were ARMs, compared to
20 percent and 53 percent, respectively, for the nation. 
Although overall foreclosure rates tend to be lower in the Tenth Dis-
trict than in the rest of the nation, the ARM-specific foreclosure rate is
higher in the district. Specifically, the prime ARM foreclosure rate was 1.6
percent in the second quarter of 2007, compared to just 1.3 percent
nationally. The subprime ARM foreclosure rate in the district was compa-
rable to the national average (8.0 percent). Subprime ARM foreclosure
rates would be higher in the district if not for exceptionally low foreclosure
rates in New Mexico and Wyoming. Nebraska’s ARM foreclosure rate was
greater than 9 percent in the second quarter of 2007, and in Oklahoma,
more than one of every ten subprime ARMs was in foreclosure.
Chart A.1
CHANGE IN FORECLOSURE RATES IN THE TENTH

























Source: Mortgage Bankers Association
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There may be several reasons for the above-average rate of ARM
foreclosures in the Tenth District. Housing is generally more affordable
than in the nation as a whole, enabling more people to get fixed-rate
mortgage products. Those who get ARMs may thus have a higher risk
profile—and thus higher foreclosures—than the average ARM mortgage
holder nationally. Another possible reason is home price appreciation.
Home price appreciation rates in the metropolitan areas of the Tenth
District tend to be lower than the national average. Lower home price
appreciation might leave more ARM borrowers in an adverse equity posi-
tion in the Tenth District than elsewhere, resulting in a higher long-term
foreclosure rate than nationally.
Foreclosures at the local level
Through early 2006, home price appreciation in local real estate
markets in the Tenth District has, in general, been less than the national
average (Table A.1). Since the slowdown in national housing markets,
however, this is no longer the case. While appreciation rates vary among
the metropolitan areas of the district, the National Association of Real-
tors (NAR) reports that only Omaha saw a decline in home prices (4.3
percent) greater than the national average (1.5 percent). NAR reports
that all other metro areas in the district saw milder declines in home
prices or continued home price appreciation than in the nation as a
whole, with Farmington, New Mexico, reporting the largest increase at
14.0 percent. Stronger current price appreciation likely results in fewer
homeowners being caught in adverse equity positions, reducing the risk
of default.
Nonetheless, the foreclosure storm is affecting some local markets in
the Tenth District much more strongly than others. Specifically, accord-
ing to data provided by RealtyTrac, foreclosure rates in the Tenth
District are much higher in urban and rapidly growing suburban coun-
ties than in rural counties (Map A.1).
17 The highest foreclosure rates in
each state are in counties near (or containing) the state’s largest city.
With only one exception, the counties with the highest foreclosure rates
in the Tenth District are around Denver, Colorado, and Kansas City,
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Table A.1




CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH 
FORECLOSURE NEIGHBORHOODS
Annual Appreciation
National Association of REALTORSa OFHEO HPIb
MSA 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07(Q2) 2006-07(Q2)
Albuquerque, NM 16.4 8.9 7.7 9.0
Boulder, CO  7.1 5.2 2.3 2.3
Colorado Springs, CO 9.8 6.0 1.4 3.3
Denver-Aurora, CO 3.3 1.0 0 .8
Farmington, NM  15.2 11.1 14.0 N/A
Kansas City, MO-KS 4.5 (.6) (.7) 3.6
Lincoln, NE 2.1 .2 (.5) 2.7
Oklahoma City, OK 2.0 9.0 3.1 3.4
Omaha, NE-IA 3.7 1.6 (4.3) 1.4
Springfield, MO 6.1 3.1 1.3 5.9
Topeka, KS 3.5 .4 6.3 5.0
Tulsa, OK  N/A N/A N/A 4.4
Wichita, KS 3.9 6.4 (.7) 5.4
United States 12.2 1.3 (1.5) 3.2
aThe National Association of REALTORS Median Sales Price of Existing Single-Family Homes; Available from
http://www.realtor.org. For more information on house price indexes, see Jordan Rappaport, 2007, “A Guide to
Aggregate House Price Measures,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 92(2), 41 – 72.
bOffice of Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) Housing Price Index (HPI); Available from
http://www.ofheo.gov.
Foreclosure Rate in  Median Income Median Home Value Subprime  High Interest
Census Tract as % of MSA  as % of MSA Mortgage  Mortgages 
Median Income Median Home Value Owners (%) 2004-06 (%)
Less than .5%  134.9 134.0 18.7 17.4
.5-1% 130.3 131.1 19.0 16.8
1-2% 117.1 112.5 22.5 20.0
2-5% 99.7 92.5 28.2 25.7
More than 5%  73.7 66.2 39.4 36.6
Sources: RealtyTrac, U.S. Census, Undisclosed national credit rating agency, and HMDA
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Missouri, the two largest cities in the district. Rapidly growing suburban
counties and some resort areas in the Rocky Mountains also have high
foreclosure rates. 
In contrast, foreclosure rates in the Tenth District’s rural counties
are relatively low. Most rural counties have foreclosure rates below 0.5
percent, and few counties outside of Colorado have foreclosure rates
greater than 2 percent. In many rural counties, there were no foreclo-
sures at all identified from June 2006 to June 2007.
18
A more detailed analysis of the Tenth District metro areas, using
data from several sources (RealtyTrac and the U.S. Census, sample data
from a national credit rating agency, and Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act mortgage origination data), suggests that low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods are experiencing levels of foreclosure well above
districtwide and national averages (Table A.2).
19 In Census tracts with
foreclosure rates less than 1 percent, median household incomes and
home values were more than 130 percent of the metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) median household incomes and home values. Generally,
neighborhoods with incomes more than 120 percent of the median
MSA income are considered higher income neighborhoods. Conversely,
Census tracts with foreclosure rates greater than 5 percent had median
Map A.1
TENTH DISTRICT FORECLOSURE RATES, BY COUNTY




Less than .5% of Mortgages
.5% - 1% of Mortgages
1% to 2% of Mortgages
2% to 5% of Mortgages
More than 5% of Mortgages
Data not Available
Source: Realty Trac and U.S. Census
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household incomes and median home values at 74 and 66 percent,
respectively, of MSA median incomes and home values. Neighborhoods
between 50 percent and 80 percent of the MSA median income are
usually classified as moderate-income neighborhoods (neighborhoods
with incomes less than 50 percent of the MSA median income are clas-
sified as “low-income” neighborhoods). 
Between these two extremes, the decrease in home values and house-
hold income as foreclosure rates increase is almost uniform. This indicates
that as foreclosure rates rise, the neighborhood is likely to be poorer.
Concentrations of subprime credit scores and high interest loans are
usually found in low- and moderate-income areas (Calem, Gillen, and
Wachter). An analysis of December 2004 data from a national credit
rating agency (Federal Reserve Board, proprietary) suggests that there
are more than twice as many homeowners with subprime credit scores
in neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates than in neighborhoods
with low foreclosure rates. Further, neighborhoods with high foreclosure
rates have more than twice as many mortgages originated with high
interest rates than neighborhoods with low foreclosure rates. Consistent
with the income and home value results, there is an almost uniform
increase in subprime credit scores and high interest loans as foreclosure
rates increase. 
Overall, the Tenth District has slightly lower levels of foreclosures
than the nation as a whole. However, there are some causes for concern
in the district. Colorado has seen a large increase in foreclosures, and
Oklahoma’s foreclosure rate has been well above the national average for
some time. Adjustable-rate products are also more likely to be in foreclo-
sure in the Tenth District than in the nation as a whole. With few
exceptions, foreclosure rates in the district are highest in cities and
rapidly growing suburban counties. Specifically, low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods in urban areas are being hit the hardest.
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GLOSSARY OF MORTGAGE TERMS
Alt-A mortgage–A mortgage with an A- credit rating. Alt-A has traditionally been
used to designate low documentation/no documentation loans but could indicate a
loan to someone with creditworthiness just below prime or a loan that does not
meet some other specified underwriting criterion. In general, Alt-A mortgages are
made to borrowers with nontraditional circumstances.
Amortization–A schedule of equal, regular payments consisting of interest and
part of the principal made over a specified time period upon the expiration of
which the entire debt is repaid.
ARM–An adjustable-rate mortgage, which is a mortgage with an interest rate and
payment that changes periodically over the life of the loan depending on short-
term market interest rates.
Cash-out refinancing–A refinance loan in excess of that required to pay off the
existing mortgage, in which the borrower receives the difference in cash.
Conforming loan–A loan that is eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac. In 2006, the loan amounts were required to be $417,000 or less.
Credit rating–A rating by lenders that conveys the creditworthiness of borrowers.
Usually these are expressed as letter grades, such as A, A-, B, C, or D.
Fannie Mae–Federal National Mortgage Association, one of two government-
sponsored entities that purchase home loans from lenders to package into securities
to sell to investors. Fannie Mae guarantees these securities.
Freddie Mac–Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, one of two govern-
ment-sponsored entities that purchase home loans from lenders to package into
securities to sell to investors. Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to provide competi-
tion in the secondary market and ensure that Fannie Mae would not have a
monopoly.
FRM–A fixed-rate mortgage, which is a mortgage loan in which the interest rate
does not change during the entire life of the loan.
Hybrid ARM-A hybrid ARM shares characteristics of an FRM and an ARM. It is a
mortgage with a fixed interest rate period of two or three years that then turns into
an adjustable-rate mortgage. 2/28 and 3/27 hybrid ARMs are common among
subprime mortgages. In this article, these terms are used to distinguish ARMs with
initial teaser rates from ones with initial rates at market rates, which we would term
3/1 or 5/1 for ARMs with initial fixed-rate periods of three or five years.
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Interest-only mortgage–A mortgage where the monthly mortgage payment con-
sists of only the interest accrued on the loan for some specified period of time,
during which the principal balance remains unchanged. After the initial interest-
only period, the payment jumps to cover both interest accrued and the portion of
the principal due according to an amortization of the loan over its remaining life.
Most interest-only loans are ARMs.
Nonprime mortgage–A mortgage with a credit rating less than A. Generally,
these are Alt-A or subprime mortgages.
Option ARM–An ARM that allows the borrower to set his own payment
terms, including making a minimum payment that is insufficient to cover the
interest accruing on the loan, resulting in negative amortization.
Prime mortgage–A mortgage issued to a borrower with a good credit rating,
usually rated A.
Refinance loan–A mortgage loan used to pay off an existing mortgage.
Securitization–The process of pooling mortgages into securities to be sold on a
secondary market.
Subprime mortgage–A mortgage issued to a borrower with impaired credit,
typically reflected in a credit score below 620. These loans generally have B or
C credit ratings. A subprime borrower generally pays a higher interest rate to
compensate the lender for the increased risk of default. Subprime loans gener-
ally do not meet the underwriting standards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
which purchase mostly A-rated mortgages.
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ENDNOTES
1More precisely, the value of the mortgage is equal to the net present value of
the future stream of payments. Depending on where market interest rates stand
relative to the contract rate on the mortgage, the mortgage value may differ from
the outstanding balance of the mortgage.
2A power of sale clause is a clause in a deed of trust or mortgage, in which the
borrower pre-authorizes the sale of property to pay off the balance on a loan in the
event of their default; thus, no judicial action is required.
3A judicial foreclosure can be pursued in any state. Because of cost differ-
ences, described below, judicial foreclosures are unlikely to be pursued in cases
where they are not required.
4Alt-A has traditionally been used to designate such low documentation/no
documentation loans, but Alt-A is synonymous with A– and could indicate a loan
to someone with credit worthiness just below prime or a loan that does not meet
some other specified underwriting criterion. A significant share of subprime orig-
inations also lack full documentation of income.
5Securitization is a process where mortgage loans are packaged into securities
that can be sold to investors. For a detailed description of the securitization
process, see Rosen. 
6This decline was not due to a decrease in the demand for mortgages, but
rather reflects an international downward trend in long-term interest rates,
spurred at least in part by aggressive action by the Federal Reserve to lower short-
term rates.
7These are employment charts reported by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current
Employment Statistics Survey, for NAICS code 522292, “Real Estate Credit,”
which consists of establishments “primarily engaged in lending funds with real
estate as collateral.”  
8The Mortgage Bankers Association estimates that the subprime share of
mortgage originations was 5.3 percent in 2003, compared to 14.0 percent in the
second quarter of 2007. This estimate assumes that the subprime foreclosure rate
would be unchanged by the overall composition of mortgages. 
9The Housing Price Index of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight is but one of several series that can be used to gauge home appreciation. For
a review of this and other indexes, see Rappaport.
10Assuming a margin of 2.25 percent over the 1-year constant maturity Trea-
sury. Margins often vary loan by loan, as can the index upon which the margin is
added. The typical margin on a prime loan is between 2 percent and 3 percent.
11A hybrid ARM shares characteristics of a FRM and an ARM. In that sense,
the 3/1 ARM discussed above is a hybrid. The 3/27 ARM and the 3/1 ARM have
a similar structure. The term 3/27 is used here to differentiate a loan with an ini-
tial three-year teaser rate, from a standard ARM with a three year fixed period,
denoted here as a 3/1. 
12Assuming a margin of 4.5 percent over the 1-year constant maturity Trea-
sury. Margins on subprime loans typically vary between 4 percent and 6 percent.
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13The assumption underlying the example is that the minimum payment is
equivalent to the payment on a mortgage with a 1 percent interest rate. Again,
here it is assumed that the interest rate at reset is equal to a margin of 4.5 percent
over the 1-year constant maturity Treasury.
14Insufficient data are available to separate the hybrid ARMs from the pool of
option ARMs and interest-only ARMs.
15The Federal Housing Finance Board survey does not ask for combined first
and second mortgage LTVs, but it is possible that some respondents provide this
value (personal communication, September 25, 2007). Junior liens generally are
unobservable to senior lien-holders.
16Holden Lewis of bankrate.com suggests that two-tiered loans have taken as
much as 40 percent of the market away from mortgage insurers. See “PMI indus-
try fights back against piggyback loans,” accessed September 25, 2007, at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20050303a1.asp.
17RealtyTrac, a national firm specializing in foreclosures, tracks foreclosure
activity throughout the United States. Foreclosure activity includes not only new
foreclosures but changes in foreclosure status to properties already in foreclosure.
When activity numbers are aggregated, it can result in double- and sometimes
triple-counting of foreclosed properties. RealtyTrac has developed an internal,
proprietary model to identify unique foreclosures in their database. We received
data from this model to conduct the foregoing analysis. These data were utilized
to analyze new foreclosures at both the county and census tract level over a one-
year period from July 1, 2006, to June 30, 2007. The number of foreclosures was
normalized based on outstanding mortgages as of the 2000 Census. This normal-
ization procedure may result in a slight overstatement of the foreclosure rate, since
the number of mortgages outstanding has risen since 2000 (by 14 percent, on
average). The foreclosure rate presented here is similar to the foreclosure initiation
rate reported by Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), with one important
caveat. The foreclosure initiations reported by MBA are shown on a quarterly
basis, whereas the data here are annual. Thus, a foreclosure rate of 2..0 percent
would be the same as MBA reporting a foreclosure initiation rate of 0.5 percent
for four straight quarters.
18Although the available data from RealtyTrac does not cover every rural
county in the District, as shown on the map, the counties that are not covered are
unlikely to be experiencing higher levels of foreclosure distress. As of September,
2007, there were only four active foreclosures within the 22 rural counties in
Nebraska not covered by RealtyTrac, according to foreclosurenet.net (accessed
September 14, 2007, at http://www.foreclosurenet.net/). Similarly, very few active
foreclosures were found in the rural counties not covered by RealtyTrac in Col-
orado, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.
19In the analysis that follows, Census Tracts are used as proxies for neighbor-
hoods. Census Tracts are often the lowest unit of geography with reliable data and
are contiguous, relatively homogenous areas within an MSA. They are therefore
generally accepted as the unit of analysis for neighborhood conditions.
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